After the detention of a Kazakh KNS officer, Anuar Bakibay, in Poland, a major scandal erupted, revealing that the KNS not only engages in espionage activities on behalf of Russia but also sells personal data of Kazakh citizens at discounted prices.
Moreover, among those whose information was "leaked" by KNS employees was their own chief, Yermek Sagimbayev.
The story titled "KNS Officers Trade Secrets. Kazakh Spy in Exchange for Political Prisoners," published by the BASE channel, uncovered only the tip of the iceberg: behind the facade of combating espionage lies a entrenched network of corruption, personal deals, and direct ties to Russian special services.
Arrest of a Kazakh Spying for Russia
At the end of July 2025, Anuar Bakibay (Anuar Bigembai), an assistant officer to the military attaché of Kazakhstan in Ukraine, was detained in Poland, becoming a high-profile international and domestic political incident.
According to Kazakh and Polish sources, Bakibay arrived in Poland on July 29, 2025, and was arrested the very next day—July 30—in the city of Bydgoszcz on suspicion of espionage, primarily targeting NATO countries and Ukraine. Notably, the Kazakh intelligence officer was acting in the interests of Russian special services, which only fueled the fire amid the unfolding scandal.
Anuar Bakibay worked in Kyiv as part of a mission under the diplomatic representation of Kazakhstan but held the status of assistant to the military attaché with accreditation, according to some sources, until April 2027. The official situation appeared unusual: Bakibay lived in Kyiv with his family—he has two children, one of whom was born in Ukraine. His unit, part of Kazakhstan’s diplomatic mission in Ukraine, operated as an autonomous block—with a separate budget, separate staff (the attaché himself, an assistant, and a specialist), and rented accommodation outside the embassy walls.
The Polish side, acting through ABW (the counterintelligence service), accused Bakibay of collecting classified information on Polish and NATO territory, as well as engaging in activities undermining EU security. The Kazakh Ministry of Defence confirmed the arrest but did not disclose the name or details.
Independent sources reported that Bakibay is a nephew (or at least a relative) of the military attaché of Kazakhstan in Ukraine, Colonel Bakytzhan Kisentayev. This relative of the attaché officially led the mission under which Bakibay operated.
The incident became a symbol of the deep dependence of the country’s special services on Russian intelligence. In a collective statement, independent Kazakh human rights organizations noted that "Bakibay’s detention provides direct confirmation of what we have been saying for years: Kazakhstan’s security services are systematically dependent on the Kremlin."
As of the time of publication, Bakibay remains in custody in Poland; no public announcement has been made regarding a diplomatic resolution or exchange. The Kazakh Ministry of Defence has stated that it is ensuring the protection of his rights and interests.
This episode became a critical point in a larger investigation concerning the intersection of diplomacy, intelligence, and information trafficking—and heightened suspicions that within the structure meant to protect the state, clans have formed, reducing national security to a currency of exchange.
KNS as a shop for trading secrets
An investigation initiated by journalists revealed that serving the interests of Russian special services, which KNS employees are involved in, is just the tip of the iceberg. The KNS has long turned into a kind of "shop for trading secrets," where information about any person can be bought at a reasonable price.
After the January 2022 events and the arrest of former KNS chairman Karim Massimov, the special service underwent a so-called purge. However, instead of radical renewal, the country saw the preservation of the old system under new names. Massimov, as a reminder, was convicted of treason and abuse of power. In 2023, media reported that he maintained contacts with Russian and Chinese structures.
Even after his departure, the processes of data access transfer and "exchanges" did not disappear—they transformed into new mechanisms within the KNS. Under the leadership of the current chairman, Yermek Sagimbayev, the agency strives to maintain the image of a "reformed structure." However, according to investigations by BASE and interviewed sources, the KNS continues not only to combat espionage but also to engage in underground dealings—from data leaks to behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Russian side.
In a BASE video, it is directly stated: "for 300 dollars, you can even buy the file of the KNS head"; "in closed Telegram channels, KNS officers offer to ’check’ any state database, including classified ones."
The investigation uncovers at least two key areas of sales: personal data and official files of high-ranking individuals, as well as leaking information to foreign intelligence services in exchange for political favors.
For instance, one episode involves the sale of Sagimbayev’s own "file"—with his Individual Identification Number (IIN), address, marital status, and other data, which were "sold for 300 dollars." The video states: "in the committee that is supposed to protect state secrets, they sell the personal data of their own chairman."
Moreover, the prices for services are very affordable—KNS officers, through Telegram channels, offered to "check" databases, including classified ones, for the same price. This becomes a sort of "low-cost tariff" for accessing state information.
In 2024, Kazakhstan faced the largest personal data leak in its history—about 16 million records. Although the KNS officially attributed the incident to an "external cyberattack," investigations by BASE and other media claim that part of the data was leaked internally and sold through front companies posing as "auditors" and former KNS officers, with operations conducted through Russian contracting structures.
A middleman company in one of the offers provided access to state databases and then sold the "checked" data on the darknet. Such a mechanism turns national security into a commodity.
Corruption and ties with the FSB
Despite the war in Ukraine and Western pressure, contacts between the KNS and the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) remain strong. Media outlets note that in 2023, meetings under the guise of "countering extremism" took place in Almaty and Astana, where Russian representatives participated more actively than before. Formally, these meetings stay within the framework of cooperation, but sources claim they have effectively become channels for data transfer and access to KNS databases.
Within the KNS itself, corruption has long outgrown isolated incidents and become a mode of operation. After Massimov’s departure, there was a mass reshuffle of personnel and the transfer of positions and contracts to "insiders." Investigations show that new beneficiaries are linked to tenders for the procurement of equipment, security systems, and cybersecurity—often with Russian contractors, despite sanctions. This means that the security structure itself becomes a participant in an economic scheme where managing security resources translates into personal profit.
Key figures and schemes
Among the key figures are: Karim Massimov—former KNS head, convicted of treason; Anuar Sadykulov—former deputy chairman of the KNS, implicated in cases of abuse of power; Yermek Sagimbayev—current KNS chairman, mentioned as a figure whose data was "sold"; mid-level officers Arman Bekenov and Marat Kasym—implicated in information leaks. In the Russian context, structures of the FSB Central District and "Rostec" are mentioned. All these episodes are corroborated by court documents and media publications.
Episodes related to "exchanges" of political prisoners have become one of the most alarming areas of activity for individuals associated with Kazakhstan’s Committee of National Security. According to investigations by BASE and independent human rights sources, it is precisely employees and intermediaries affiliated with the KNS who have turned the fates of those convicted in political cases into a tool for unofficial negotiations with Russia and third countries. Through informal channels and intermediaries from special services, offers of "exchange" were made—release or leniency for specific individuals in return for loyalty, silence, or the transfer of sensitive data.
One of the most discussed cases was the story of Anuar Bakibay, the Kazakh detained for espionage in Poland, who was attempted to be included in unofficial negotiations for the return or pardon of Kazakh political prisoners convicted for anti-war and anti-corruption protests. In circles close to the KNS, a scheme was considered under which Bakibay could be exchanged for one or several well-known political activists under investigation in Kazakhstan. Human rights defenders directly called this "trading people in the interests of intelligence" and demanded international intervention.
Additionally, in recent months, journalists and lawyers have noted the emergence of gray schemes where the release of certain prisoners was formalized under "humanitarian grounds," but accompanied by the disappearance of public records of corruption cases within KNS structures. Several sources indicated that the price of these releases was either money or informational services—including data on civil activists and opposition groups. Such practices completely blur the line between intelligence, business, and political cynicism, turning security institutions into mechanisms of blackmail and internal repression.
Taken together, these facts paint an extremely alarming picture: a structure meant to protect the country is turning into a tool for bargaining. When a special service itself offers its internal data "to the market," when political prisoners become objects of exchange, when external operations work "for a client" rather than the state—the homeland ceases to be the goal; it becomes currency. Today, the KNS is not only a security agency but also a market of influence, where officers trade information, politicians trade people, and the interests of the state are a commodity.
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