Microchip deliveries are made through intermediary companies based in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkey and China.
This is reported by investigatebel.
Western sanctions were designed to cut off Russia’s access to the technology and materials needed to produce missiles and precision weapons. In November 2022, Ukrainian Defence Minister Oleksii Reznikov said that the Kremlin had 119 Iskander missiles left out of the 900 available at the start of a full-scale war. The number of other precision missiles has also decreased.
Two years later, in December 2024, Andriy Yusov, a spokesman for the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, stated that Russia had increased the number of missiles “critically dependent on foreign components” despite regular shelling. He said Russia was producing some 50 Iskanders a month and was also building up its stockpile of other types of missiles.
As the BIC investigation has shown, Belarus is directly linked to this.
Why doesn’t the rocket stockpile run out?
In October 2022, following a meeting with Vladimir Putin, Aleksandr Lukashenko confirmed the Russian Federation’s urgent need for microchips:
“In the most recent talks, the President of Russia said: ‘We are ready to pay any amount of money for a microelectronics product’”.
A year later, Ukrainian electronics and weapons expert Serhii Beskrestnov, who goes by the call sign “Flash”, published photos of the Zarya-61M onboard computer module used in Russian missiles on his Telegram channel. This controlling device consists of four main printed circuit boards.
“Yes, everything is outmoded. Yeah, it’s huge. But, alas, it is made entirely from Russian components. It is manufactured, it flies, it kills”, he wrote.
The BIC examined the photographs of the circuit boards provided by Beskrestnov and found that not all of the electronics in the device were Russian-made. Some chips show a logo in the shape of a lightning bolt or the Russian letter “И”. This is a trademark of the Belarusian state-owned company Integral (full name JSC Integral — Integral Holding Managing Company).
Source: dsns.gov.ua, YouTube. AI-generated collage
The use of Integral microchips in Russian weapons is also confirmed by the content of a Ukrainian expert, a serviceman of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, who wished to remain anonymous. In his YouTube vlog, he demonstrates these components in the R-37, Kh-59M2A, S-300, Kh-101 and Iskander rockets. In a comment to the BIC, he stated that half of the chips in the latter two missiles are from Integral’s production. As you can see in the photos, some of them were released in 2023.
Source: Serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
The Ukrainian Security Service also confirmed to the BIC that components manufactured by Integral are used in Russian missiles.
“Upon the examination of the remnants of the Russian missile from the Kalibr missile system, investigators from the Security Service have determined that the microcircuits utilised in its construction were manufactured at the facilities of the enterprise in question”, said a representative of the Ukrainian agency.
Source: president.gov.by, kremlin.ru / Aleksandr Lukashenko, Vladimir Putin. AI-generated collage
This means that Russia can continue to fire missiles at Ukraine, thanks in part to supplies from Belarus. In total, Integral shipped more than 6 million microchips worth more than $130 million to Russia between March 2022 and June 2024, according to customs data available to the BIC. By comparison, the total value of Belarusian microchip shipments to the Russian Federation during this period was just over $165 million. That is, Integral provided 80% of them.
Since the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, Integral’s revenues have multiplied. In 2023, the company’s net profit increased by more than 11 times compared to 2022 — to almost 150 million Belarusian rubles (about $50 million). That is 40 times Integral’s 2021 earnings. At the time of publication, data for 2024 is not publicly available.
Customers from the Russian military-industrial complex
The BIC analysed Integral’s customers from March 2022 to July 2024. Smolensk-based AO Integral-Zapad was the largest Russian buyer of its microchips during this period. It purchased $31.3 million worth of products. The company has no direct links with Belarusian Integral, but it is owned by a Belarusian citizen. Until July 2022, the company’s website reported cooperating with the Russian Ministry of Defence. The website was undergoing a redesign as this was published.
The second largest purchaser was Russia’s AO Spets-Elektronkomplekt, which bought $30 million worth of microchips from Integral. The company’s website does not provide information on defence industry links. However, the company’s partner, a large Russian microchip manufacturer AO Angstrem, points out on its website that Spets-Elektronkomplekt was certified by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation in 1998 and received Leader-Follower Certificate No. 1 (official recognition as a reliable supplier to the military-industrial complex).
SP AO Integral Spb, a subsidiary of the Belarusian company Integral in St Petersburg, is another major buyer. It purchased $16.8 million worth of chips. The company’s CEO, Vladimir Lazovsky, has openly stated that the Russian military-industrial complex is one of its main customers. In 2021, the company received a certificate of conformity from the Oboronsertifika system, and after the outbreak of full-scale war, it fell under European Union sanctions.
In addition to the above, Integral supplied products to Russian companies AO EKB Innovatsionnye Tekhnologii, which purchased $16.7 million of microchips, OOO Don, which purchased $9.5 million of products, and AO Radiant-EK, which purchased $5.3 million of microchips. These companies are also linked to the Russian defence industry.
Western equipment
Western equipment is used in Integral, as seen in the 2024 reports of the Belarusian and Russian state TV channels. The footage includes German Axiotron Carl Zeiss AG microscopes for chip quality control, Swiss VAT Vakuumventile AG valves and British Edwards vacuum systems for maintaining sterility in production processes.
Also on display are DISCO Corporation’s Japanese slicers for micron precision wafer separation and HORIBA’s material analysis equipment. US-made Cascade Microtech’s (FormFactor) test systems, which can be used to check the performance of microchips before they are assembled, are also demonstrated.
The company’s official catalogue states that Integral makes products using Western equipment. The operation of this equipment is dependent on a constant supply of Western raw materials and components, without which its use is impossible. Sanctions prohibit the sale of Western raw materials and components to Belarus.
The importance of these components is confirmed by data from the internal correspondence of an organization that is, part of the Russian state corporation Rostec, Russia’s largest arms manufacturer:
“In the current political and economic environment, the main suppliers of third-party components, such as AO Girikond, AO NZPP Vostok, and AO Elekond, have increased the delivery time to 540 days, which is 150% of the performance time of the supply contract for products to be delivered to AO SKTB RT. Also, suppliers of active components, such as AO Gruppa Kremniy-EL, AO Angstrem, AO VZPP-S, OAO Integral, which depend on the supply of imported materials and chemicals, find it difficult to guarantee the fulfilment of deliveries to AO SKTB RT”, reads the document, which we obtained thanks to leaked emails and internal documents from Roselectronics, which were obtained by OCCRP and analyzed by BIC.
However, despite EU and US sanctions to restrict the supply of strategic dual-use materials and equipment to Belarus, Integral continues to receive necessary components and raw materials from EU countries.
Hydrochloric acid for Integral
One of the critical materials for Integral is high-purity hydrochloric acid, also known as hydrogen chloride.
Hydrochloric acid is used to treat semiconductor wafers. This process ensures perfect cleanliness and smoothness. These are key parameters for the deposition of complex chip structures. Even the smallest amount of contamination on the wafers can lead to product defects and reduced product quality.
Source: integral.by / Andrei Buinevich. AI-generated collage
In 2021, hydrochloric acid with a purity of 99.999% was supplied to Integral by the German company UrSeCo Handels GmbH & Co. KG.
But a new delivery scheme emerged in 2022, when sanctions banned the chemical from entering Russia. The supplies passed through Poland and Turkey to Kazakhstan before reaching Belarus.
A local company, TOO United Trading Group, is the recipient of the acid in Kazakhstan. Behind the massy name is a company with just one employee. It was founded a few weeks after the outbreak of full-scale war. It supplied Russia, particularly OOO Siltron and OOO Elektronsnab, with the same high-purity acid.
These two companies delivered acid with the same characteristics to Belarus. In the case of deliveries from Elektronsnab to Integral, the place of manufacture is specified as being in Germany.
Coincidences in the dates and volumes of successive sanction-evading shipments from Germany to Russia along the chain we have described may indicate that the same German acid was coming from Germany to Russia.
In particular, on June 9, 2022, Germany’s UrSeCo Handels delivered 860 kg of high-purity hydrochloric acid produced by Germany’s Wacker Chemie AG to Kazakhstan’s United Trading Group.
In the same month, United Trading Group delivered a consignment of the same Germany-made substance of precisely the same weight to the Russian company Elektronsnab.
Elektronsnab supplied German acid to Integral until the end of 2023.
In July 2024, the EU imposed sanctions banning the supply of German acid not only to Russia, through which it had been supplied to Integral since the start of the full-scale war, but also to Belarus. The Russian company Siltron, founded less than three months after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, also began to deliver this chemical to the company. In September 2024, the company sold it directly to Integral. In July that year, an intermediary was used — the Belarusian firm OOO Digna-NTR.
United Trading Group is officially listed as the acid producer in the deliveries from Kazakhstan’s company to Siltron. But this is hardly the truth. Firstly, according to the official register of business entities in Kazakhstan, the company has only one employee (in the register, it is classified as “micro-entrepreneurship”). Secondly, this micro-enterprise’s activities do not include production, but only wholesale trade. We also found no information that hydrochloric acid with a purity of 99.999% is produced in Kazakhstan. In September 2023, the Kazakh government adopted a decree stating that the only hydrochloric acid producer in the country is Joint Stock Company Kaustik. The maximum available purity of the substance at that time was 35%. Since then, there have been no reports of new production meeting the parameters.
Finally, some shipments of alleged Kazakh acid from Siltron to Belarus were marked with the brand name SEMICOSIL HLC 5.5. Wacker Chemie, a German concern, owns this trademark. Integral’s documents relating to the acid purchase from Digna-NTR, which received the chemical from Siltron, list Germany as the place of acid production.
In July 2024, Siltron delivered two batches of acid to Digna-NTR: one of 150 kilograms and the other of 100 kilograms. In both shipments, the country of origin was indicated as Kazakhstan. At the same time, the substance brand was German SEMICOSIL HLC 5.5.
Digna-NTR, in turn, delivered the same amount to Integral.
Russia’s Siltron is directly linked with UrSeCo Handels, an acid supplier from Germany. Both companies are owned by members of the same family. The managing director and 45% owner of the German company UrSeCo Handels is Alexander Andreyevich Zhdanov. In November 2023, a person with the same surname — Alexander Aleksandrovich Zhdanov — provided a loan to the Russian company Siltron. On January 13, 2025, he also became the owner of 90% of this company, according to the Russian database of companies and entrepreneurs SPARK.
As the BIC discovered, Alexander Andreyevich and Alexander Aleksandrovich Zhdanovs are probably father and son. The Russian Federation passport database shows they are from the same family.
Workarounds
Hydrochloric acid is one of many examples of how Integral continues to purchase banned Western equipment, spare parts and materials to circumvent sanctions. Among the materials and technologies critical to Integral are MWM 2032 gas engines and spare parts. These German motors ensure a stable power supply for production processes. Intermediary companies help the company circumvent the export ban to Belarus and Russia introduced in 2022.
For instance, in the spring of 2024, the company purchased spare parts for these engines five times through the Belarus-based companies OOO Motory i Transmissiya, OOO Promelcom, and OOO Imperiya Zapad. In addition, on December 20, 2024, Integral placed a new tender for the purchase of parts and spare parts for MWM engines for $300,000.
Integral’s suppliers confirmed the use of schemes to circumvent the sanctions. BIC journalists contacted representatives of intermediary companies, acting as potential customers.
“Sanctions are a non-issue", said Illia Barouski, deputy head of OOO Imperiya Zapad. He said they also have "their own company in Poland, which facilitates the purchase of goods, and these goods are then sent from Poland to Belarus, Russia, and other countries, initially imported from Poland".
Evgenii Kazakov, founder of OOO Promelcom, said that sanctions circumvention schemes ensure prompt delivery of products: “In terms of time, we will bring it quickly — within a week or two. We have already established this. It should say ’through Kyrgyzstan’. But it’s us who delivers. So, it will be quick".
Gaps in sanctions
Another example of sanctions circumvention that BIC journalists discovered was the purchase of mini-electric motors manufactured by the German company Faulhaber Group. In May 2024, Integral purchased 44 such devices from the Chinese company Hebei Nanuo Alloy Material Co. Ltd.
Source: AI-generated collage
Supplies of Western components create an opportunity for their reproduction, which could be considered dangerous, Ukrainian aviation expert Anatolii Khrapchynskyi explained to BIC:
“There is a concept called re-engineering. This is when they copy some Western element: they take it apart, grind it down layer by layer, study how it works and can reproduce it”.
For some of them, there is no such need at all. Among Integral’s purchases, BIC found Western components that are not included in the US and EU sanctions lists. These include argon-ion lasers, polishing slurries, polishing wheels, and parts used in the production of semiconductors and microelectronics.
In addition, although Integral Holding’s main enterprise is included in the US sanctions lists, the EU has not added it to its list of restrictions.
BIC sent a request to the European Commission and relevant regulators asking them to explain the discrepancies in the sanctions policy against Integral and its suppliers.
We received a comment from Tom Keatinge, director of the Center for Finance and Security at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), which specializes in defence, security and international relations:
“Russia and Belarus are constantly seeking ways in which to procure key products for Russia’s war in Ukraine in violation of sanctions. This inevitably means that countries that border Russia - particularly those that are members of the Eurasian Economic Area - will be involved in this evasion activity. <...> Ukraine’s allies need to be tougher in the use of the powers they have to ’name-and-shame’ and sanction those companies (or even whole countries) that allow circumvention to occur. There has been a lot of diplomatic dialogue, but at some point the talking needs to be backed up by action”.
We also contacted Integral and all participants in the supply chain — Digna-NTR, Wacker Chemie, Elektronsnab, Siltron, United Trading Group, and UrSeCo Handels — asking them to comment on the discovered facts of violation of sanctions legislation.
Siltron replied that it had never imported hydrogen chloride from the EU but produced it in the Nizhny Novgorod Region "using our proprietary patented technology", "enabling us [the company] to maintain competitive pricing (lower than Chinese equivalents) and guarantee supply stability, which is an important aspect for our partners".
Alexander Zhdanov, managing director and co-owner of UrSeCo Handels, told the BIC in a telephone conversation that they do not sell hydrochloric acid. He refused to answer any clarifying questions about their cooperation with United Trading Group and Siltron, suggesting we send written questions or come to the company’s office in person. In response to our email, representatives of the German company stated that they had contacted German state authorities to protect themselves from "free found defamation" and "false suspicions". The agencies allegedly warned the company that the Belarusian Investigative Centre was a "pool of fake news" and advised them not to provide any information.
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